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what people are writing about

BOOKS

The Wreck of the Penn Central
by Joseph R. Daughen and Peter
Binzen, Little, Brown & Company,
Boston, 365 pages, $7.95.

Imagine two giant corporations,
neither of them earning a substan
tial profit, two administrations, one
geared to better marketing prac
tices, one aimed at volume for the
sake of volume, three top execu
tives, none of whom is on cordial
—or even speaking—terms with the
others.

Merge the corporations, on a
one-for-one basis, where all three
antagonistic top executives are held
in positions of major authority, and
where line management is taken
over by representatives of each of
the two companies so that a de
partment head from Company A
has as assistant an executive from
Company B.
Superimpose on all of this a Gov
ernment regulatory body which has
control of the prices that can be
charged, the services that must be
maintained, whether profitable or
unprofitable, and you have The
Wreck of the Penn Central.
This history of the dismal, 871day record of the largest corporate

merger in
American
history
(which ended with the most re
sounding bankruptcy in American
history) touches nearly all the
stops in its detailing of the almost
incredible downhill path of the
transportation complex, from its
formation in February, 1968, until
its ignominious end in June, 1970.
Take, first of all, the three princi
pal officers, Stuart Saunders, Alfred
Perlman, and David Bevan. The
first and the last were old Pennsyl
vania Railroad men, but they both
seemed to believe that the rail
road’s profitable days were over,
that the future lay in diversifica
tion, in investing railroad money in
other ventures that would return a
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higher profit. The third, Alfred
Perlman, a New York Central man,
believed the business of the rail
road was the railroad, that every
penny spent on improving main
tenance or rail service would pay
off in increased earnings.
Saunders, the Pennsylvania man,
was made chairman of the board of
the new Penn Central. Perlman, the
New York Central man, was made
president and chief of operations
for the complex. Bevan, the finan
cial man, was made vice president
of finance, but was not given a
seat on the board of directors.
Divided authority

So, in effect, a troika form of
government was set up—made even
more divisive by the fact that Saun
ders knew comparatively little
about railroading, and that Bevan,
though in charge of finance, was
not allowed to control the budget.
As a matter of fact, he wasn’t even
allowed to see it; Perlman didn’t
believe in income budgets and re
fused to submit them.
Add to this, the fact that operat
ing headquarters for the new com
plex was located in Philadelphia,
but that Perlman refused to move
there from New York, and that line
executives from the two railroads,
which had been bitter rivals for
years, were inextricably mixed up
in the new organization.
There lay the seeds of the even
tual disaster, the book’s authors,
two Philadelphia newspapermen,
Joseph R. Daughen and Peter Bin
zen, seem to believe. Or, at least,
the sheer size of the eventual disas
ter resulted from these causes.
For disaster there might have
been in any event. The two lines
were both in very bad shape
physically at the time of the mer
ger. They had come out of the war
years the largest carriers in the East
but they had come out with a
badly exhausted physical plant,
with rails worn out by the constant
traffic of troops and freight trains,
with rolling stock worn out by the
same hard use. They were handi
capped, too, by a freight pattern
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in the nation’s most densely popu
lated area that caused most freight
hauls to be short and, therefore,
comparatively unprofitable.
And the Penn Central had the
highest wage costs of any railroad
in the country.
The merger compounded all the
troubles facing both lines.
First of all, the two lines’ com
puter systems were incompatible.
Although both roads had IBM sys
tems, one was fed computer print
out and punched tape, one used
IBM cards for entry. So all infor
mation generated in New York
Central territory had to be labori
ously translated into a second med
ium in New York for eventual
transfer to the main computer cen
ter in Philadelphia.
Then the merging of personnel,
although it looked good on paper,
worked out disastrously in prac
tice. The two lines each had freight
yards of their own in a number of
cities, but the dispatcher, if he were
an old New York Central man, was
apt not to know the location of the
Pennsylvania’s yards in Cincinnati,
Chicago, or Cleveland (the reverse,
of course, being true if he were
an old Pennsylvania man). So
freight trains became disastrously
snarled, waybills became separated
from the cars they presumably
were accompanying, entire train
loads became lost between their
dispatch points and their destina
tions.
All of this hit the railroad fi
nancially, of course, because the
Penn Central never had enough
freight cars, and so was always
renting them on a per diem basis
from other lines. With entire trains
lost somewhere in the system, costs
mounted astronomically just as in
come was dropping.
This, in turn, hastened the finan
cial day of reckoning. Perlman was
still plowing money into the rail
road; Bevan and Saunders were
still attempting to invest railroad
assets in businesses that promised a
more profitable return. The rail
road’s cash flow position became
more critical daily. Bevan, although
he had no control over the budget,

was responsible for getting money
for the operations of the line and
he mortgaged almost every physi
cal asset the railroad and its vari
ous properties had, finally resorting
to borrowing money from banks
with no collateral at all. The Penn
Central’s credit with the banks was
always good; the Pennsylvania
Railroad had never missed a divi
dend since its establishment in 1849
and even during its darkest days
the new complex kept on paying
dividends.
Eventually, of course, the bubble
burst. There was a last-minute at
tempt to get Federal guarantees for
one more loan, and for a time the
railroad fervently believed the
guarantee would come through—as
did many officials in Washington.
However, powerful Congressional
opposition developed to the loan
guarantee scheme, and its most
ardent sponsors abandoned it
and the Penn Central. A special
meeting of the railroad’s board on
Sunday, June 21, 1970, drew a pe
tition for reorganization under Sec
tion 77 of the bankruptcy act.
The board, true to the Penn Cen
tral tradition of doing nearly every
thing wrong, raised the salaries of
many of its top officers as the first
order of business before moving on
to the distressing matter of peti
tioning for reorganization under
Section 77. The order was signed
within the hour by Judge C. Wil
liam Kraft, Jr., of the United States
District Court for Eastern Pennsyl
vania.
The Penn Central Transporta
tion Company had reached the end
of the line.
The book ignores the detailed ac
counting implications of the col
lapse, but it does sketch in the in
credibly
involved picture of
properties owned by the railroad,
and the financial machinations
some of its officers allegedly in
dulged in. Some officers, for exam
ple, are reported to have formed a
private investment club. They would
then use Penn Central funds to
make vast purchases of stocks held
by the club, after which they would
sell their personal holdings at arti
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ficially high levels, while simulta
neously buying additional quanti
ties for the Penn Central portfolio.
Whether the final disaster could
have been averted is one of those
intriguing questions that can never
be answered unequivocally. What
does seem certain is that if the mer
ger had never been attempted in the
first place, the New York Central
would have put what money it
could raise into improving service,
and relations between Perlman and
his own financial man would have
been incomparably better than they
were between Perlman and Bevan.
The Pennsylvania would have let
the railroad deteriorate but would
have kept pumping money into its
attempt to build a conglomerate—
and it would probably have done
so far more successfully if it had
not had to enter into increasingly
dubious ventures to finance Perl
man’s demands for cash.
And, finally, if the two roads had
never merged, the incredible tie-up
that occurred from misdirected
trains and bad computer communi
cations would not have occurred.
All in all, this book is almost a
case history of how not to go about
a merger and so is must reading.
The sheer size of the merger was,
perhaps, its one overwhelming at
traction; on every other score it
made little or no sense. The clash
in corporate philosophies between
the New York Central men and the
Pennsylvania men, their ignorance
about the locations of the other’s
facilities, the divided responsibili
ties at the top—all these were early
harbingers of trouble.
All in all, it was a hell of a way
to run a railroad.

Valuing a Company: Practices
and Procedures by George D.
McCarthy, CPA, and Rorert E.

Healy, CPA, The Ronald Press
Company, New York, 1971, 521
pages, $25.

This manual, by two partners of
Price Waterhouse & Co., covers just
about everything a professional
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would need to know about valuing
a business.
Four major purposes of company
valuation are stressed in this con
cise, comprehensive, but far from
lively guide: for public offerings;
for acquisition and merger pur
poses; for tender offers; and for
Federal estate, gift, and income tax
purposes.
The section on valuation for pub
lic offerings is of interest to inves
tors as well as to management and
CPAs.
It reviews SEC requirements for
initial offerings; tax, procedural,
and pricing considerations; and the
weight that should be given to
various factors in the securities
markets.
A unique feature of the book is
a series of comprehensive tables
presenting critical data for com
panies in various industries in
volved in mergers and acquisitions,
public offerings, tax valuations, and
tender offers and for a selected
number of conglomerates. These
tables were the result of “a vast
amount of research” in financial
publications, proxy statements, an
nual reports, stock listing applica
tions, and tax decisions.

Information tables
For reference in preparing initial
offerings, the book tabulates, for 20
industries, the total number of
stock issues listed on the New York
Stock Exchange, the total number
of shares and the total market value
in 1968 and in 1970 and gives simi
lar information for listed bonds.
Another table reports, for 11 dates
between 1962 and 1967, price-earn
ings ratios of 11 industry stock
groups, compared to the price-earn
ings ratio of a composite of 425
industrial stock. In a table that
stretches over nearly 14 pages the
authors give basic data on 200 initial
offerings of common stock between
1962 and 1966: offering date, num
ber of shares outstanding after of
fering, aggregate and per-share
price to the public, underwriters’
discounts and commissions, esti

mated expenses, earnings per share
for the three years prior to the of
fering, price-earnings ratio for the
fiscal year prior to the offering, and
the highest and the April 28, 1967,
market prices.
The section on business combina
tions covers basic considerations,
caveats and investigations; ac
counting questions; SEC and Stock
Exchange requirements; tender of
fers; valuation factors; and con
glomerates. A tabulation of 75 ten
der offers lists the shares outstand
ing at the offering date, the number
of shares requested, the offering
price, the approximate market price
before the offer, the premium of
fered (as a percentage of the mar
ket price) and the results of the
tender offers. A mammoth set of
tables on mergers lists 142 acqui
sitions financed by issue of stock,
57 cash purchases, and 25 acquisi
tions by a combination of stock and
cash, with pertinent financial data
from and after the merger.

Conglomerates
A chapter on conglomerates at
tempts to evaluate the advantages
of this method of expansion, with
tabulation of indebtedness, stock
holders’ equity, and net income for
21 of them. A fairly detailed case
study of Walter Kidde & Company
illustrates how earnings per share
may be improved through acquisi
tions.
Other types of valuations dis
cussed include those required for a
“stepped up” basis in a taxable ac
quisition of a company; valuations
of small professional and personal
service organizations; valuations in
regulated industries; and valuations
for dissenting stockholders.
An appendix more than 50 pages
long contains such background doc
uments as listings of the financial
statements required by the SEC for
a new issue and for an acquisition,
a digest of the Justice Department's
merger guidelines, and a summary
of state laws regarding rights of
dissident stockholders.
This book is not light reading,
and its price is as heavy as its style.
Management Adviser

It is, nonetheless, an invaluable ref
erence work that belongs in the
library of every CPA firm and
probably of most corporations as
well.

MAGAZINES
The Accountant, Data Collection
and Social Exchange by John J.
McDonough, The Accounting Re

Briefly listed

view, October, 1971.

Black Capitalism: Strategy for
Business in the Ghetto by Theo
dore L. Cross, Atheneum, New
York, 1971, 274 pages, $3.45
(paperbound).

Contemporary controllers are op
erating in a changing organizational
environment and have an oppor
tunity to expand their role by sup
plying better intelligence to top
management. An understanding
and application of social exchange
theory helps focus upon the prob
lems this larger role presents.

This is the paperback edition of a
book that received the McKinsey
Foundation award in 1969. Its an
alysis of the problems inhibiting
the development of “black capital
ism” and what to do about them
led to the establishment of the
Opportunity Funding Corporation,
through the Office of Economic
Opportunity. On the whole, in
spite of the organizations that
stemmed from it, the book is prob
ably as valid now as it was in 1969
—and certainly as interesting.
Institutional
Investing:
The
Theory and Practice of Manag
ing Large Portfolios of Other
People’s Money — in Pension
Funds, Mutual Funds, Endow
ments, and Trusts—and Achiev
ing Sustained Superior Perform
ance by Charles D. Ellis, Dow
Jones-Irwin, Inc., Homewood, Il

linois 60430, 1971, 253 pages, $9.95.

This book, by a vice president of
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc.,
describes the portfolio management
methods of the leading institutional
investors. It is aimed at present
and prospective investment an
alysts and portfolio managers and
at those who select them. Topics
include bond, cash, and equities
policies; portfolio operations; port
folio analysis; opportunity analy
sis; financial analysis; business an
alysis; analytical pitfalls; risk an
alysis and management; market an
alysis; endowment funds; pension
funds, and individuals as clients;
and the impact of institutional in
vesting on corporations and capital
markets.
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The rate of corporate growth, de
centralization, and expansion of
high technology industries have, in
recent years, emphasized manage
ment’s need to maintain adequate
control over operations. The con
trollership function has responded
to this increased need for intelli
gence by modifying its objectives
toward acquiring more relevant,
timely, and accurate information.
In order to accomplish this task, the
controller has to go beyond the tra
ditional approaches of data accum
ulation and comparing actual per
formance against standards to com
pute variances. Since the variances
alone seldom provide sufficient in
sight for managerial action, addi
tional information must be obtained
from individuals who may be in re
mote parts of the organization.
McDonough suggests that the ac
countant’s ability to collect data on
an unprogramed and ad hoc basis
may be the key to greater organi
zational influence, but is not with
out additional problems.
The theory of social exchange
describes the underlying dynamics
between two parties in some social
relationship as a series of transac
tions in which both perceive a
“profit” from the other. This process
calls for a general balancing of ob
ligations in order to sustain mean
ingful relationships.
For McDonough, social exchange
theory is extremely valuable as it
calls attention to several factors rel
evant to information collection.

(1) Information collection empha
sizes the commodities exchanged in
order to sustain interaction.
(2) The commodities are a num
ber of social needs including power,
status, affection, respect, help,
knowledge, and emotional support.
(3) Any relationship has a great
deal of uncertainty because of its
dependence upon the unknown
needs and values of the other party.
(4) The feedback process pro
vides a sensitive mechanism to sig
nal an unstable condition in the
balance of obligations.

Conflict areas
McDonough
discusses
three
areas which contribute to weaken
ing the accountant’s position as he
attempts to collect data. The first of
these is that the objectives or pri
orities of the informant are not con
gruent with those of the solicitor.
This can result in conflict as the
informant regards requests for in
formation as secondary to his pri
mary task.
Secondly, the solicitor initiates
nearly 100 per cent of the social
exchanges by requesting informa
tion and thus immediately upsets
the “balance of trade,” by going
into debt.
Another problem that is likely to
cause breakdown is that the in
formant has a greater degree of
control over the relationship than
one would at first suspect. The in
formant often may feign compli
ance while avoiding real coopera
tion. Some of these tactics are:
(1) Delay—Stall techniques are
often effective and are popular as
a “first line of defense.”
(2) Feigned Ignorance—The so
licitor is often in the position of not
knowing whom to ask or precisely
the best, penetrating question. This
makes it difficult to evaluate the
worth of an answer or judge its
sincerity.
(3) Overcompliance—Using this
tactic the informant overwhelms
the solicitor with a mountain of
information in the form of manuals,
tapes, files, and memos. He thus
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avoids giving meaningful informa
tion while appearing to comply.
The author’s conclusions are that
as controllers expand their role and
supply better intelligence to man
agement, they should be aware of
the real problems the expanded
role presents. The financial man
agement function may not be
viewed as most important to line
managers; therefore, the accoun
tant’s approach must be consistent
with his bargaining position. The
informant has several tactics avail
able to him to avoid cooperation,
in addition to the lack of skill on
the part of the solicitor in framing
sharp questions.
If successful at developing stable
communication nets within the or
ganization, the role of the accoun
tant will move away from that of
partisan watchdog of top manage
ment toward one of “integration.”
The work of Lawrence and Lorsch
suggests the need for achieving
unity of effort among the functional
specialists in business. McDonough
nominates accountants to fill this
need as the focus shifts from that
of uncovering “skeletons” toward
facilitating interaction within the
organization.
K. B. Ehrenreich, CPA
University of Southern California
City Hall Discovers Productivity
by Dan Cordtz, Fortune, October,
1971.

The burgeoning demands on the
resources of local governments are
requiring reexamination of the
traditional emphasis on simply find
ing new sources of funds. Cur
rently, there is a newly awakened
interest in more efficient cost man
agement and improved produc
tivity.
This article presents a concise
picture of the dilemma of local gov
ernments in the United States to
day. It points out that, while many
municipal services are still a bar
gain by some standards, the costs
of such services are skyrocketing
but the services themselves often
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appear to be deteriorating. The in
creasing costs are in direct contrast
to the mood of the local taxpayer,
irrespective of the fact that local
taxes are but a small percentage of
Federal taxes. The reason that the
taxpayer expresses his angry mood
toward local taxes is that these
taxes have risen sharply in recent
years while Federal taxes have
been high for decades.
Characteristics of local spending

The revolt of local taxpayers
against new funding and taxes was
brought out by the author in citing
examples of amounts and types of
expenditures. For instance, Newark
property taxpayers pay $2,700 on
a $30,000 home. Nearly 26 per cent
of the $34.2 billion in 1970 munic
ipal taxes, or $7.2 billion, went for
general administration and control
of the municipal operations. Nearly
all functions of the services ren
dered are labor intensive and the
number of workers is increasing
more rapidly than the population
as a whole. The public is well
aware of this growth and is resist
ing all efforts to raise the local
taxes. Local officeholders are real
izing that lowering costs and in
creasing productivity are the an
swer to providing adequate serv
ices without increasing the costs to
the local taxpayer. How is this to
be accomplished?

police can be optimized. The same
methods were applied to the de
ployment of fire equipment.
New York City’s massive prob
lems have led to the Technology
Application Program. TAP win
nowed some 500 suggestions down
to 15 high-priority cost cutting
and effectiveness programs—the
most significant of which increased
fire protection productivity at an
estimated savings of $15 million.
Again trash and garbage collection
problems were attacked, but to
absolutely no avail in New York,
where the collection costs are $49
per ton. San Francisco, on the other
hand, simply turned the job over
to a private company—at an aver
age cost of $18 per ton. The ob
stacles to raising worker produc
tivity are prompting officials to
seek more and more services that
might be performed by private
companies.
This article should be carefully
considered by all citizens as well
as governmental managers. The
author is far from being overly
optimistic about the newly awak
ened interests of municipal leaders.
He does point out, however, that
pressures are causing local leaders
to reevaluate their function of
simply finding new sources of
funds and to turn their interests to
ward more efficient management
and increased productivity.
Barry A. Knight
University of Southern California

Productivity
While the computer is omni
present, its use as an analytical
tool for decision making has been
virtually ignored by municipalities.
Now, however, the computer is be
ing utilized in finding possible in
creases in productivity. Los Ange
les, for instance, was able to
reduce the time it takes to collect
a ton of refuse from 2.68 hours to
1.67 hours through a computerbased study that even included
measurements of energy expended
by crew members. The computer is
aiding crime detection and preven
tion as well—with analysis of mas
sive historical data, deployment of
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